The Rise of China and Its Neighborhood Diplomacy: Implications for Japanese Foreign Policy by Takahara Akio
The Rise of China and Its Neighborhood 
Diplomacy: Implications for Japanese 
Foreign Policy
Akio TAKAHARA
Abstract
The rise of China is a complex phenomenon, and so are its relationships with 
the neighboring nations. There is no doubt that its rapid economic growth has 
generally improved people’s living standards and heightened China’s international 
status. It is also certain that this has brought about the basis for the legitimacy 
of Communist dictatorship as well as basic social stability. However, economic 
growth seems to have reached a turning point and signs of social instability are 
increasingly felt. Still, China’s growth rate is much higher than other nations. 
Unless there is political turmoil, China’s presence in the region and in the world 
will continue to increase. It is not difficult to predict that, for fear of the China 
threat theory, China will try to maintain a cooperative diplomatic posture that 
emphasizes peaceful development. At the same time, China will continue with 
its military build-up and will not be conciliatory in the specific conflicts with its 
neighbors. There is a close linkage between internal politics and external policies, 
and just like in other countries, the more unstable the domestic situation becomes, 
the more hardline the diplomatic posture is required to be. Considering such 
trends in China, Japanese diplomacy needs to decrease the risks and increase 
the chances by 1) supporting China’s indigenous social development and human 
security, 2) striving to build a democratic regional regime in East Asia, 3) 
enhancing mutual trust in the area of security while maintaining the alliance with 
the United States, and 4) promoting dialogue and exchange to increase mutual 
understanding between the two nations.
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Introduction
The rise of China is still at the center of global attention. Although its growth seemed 
to lose traction in 2008, it has since accelerated again. It is still fresh in our memories 
that at the beginning, China’s rapid growth was perceived as a threat in many 
countries. They believed that the inflow of a large amount of cheap Chinese products 
and the outflow of domestic factories to China was leading to deindustrialization in 
their countries. However, after China joined the WTO in 2001, the beginning of the 
21st century, people became more aware that there is an interaction between the rise 
of China and globalization and that they promote each other. Economic exchanges 
between China and the world dramatically expanded through trade and direct 
investment, and many foreign firms made a record breaking profit from it. In particular, 
China became the biggest trading partner for Taiwan, quite naturally, and neighboring 
countries including Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Books with titles such as “China’s 
Rise” were published one after another in Japan and Western countries in the 21st 
century, although I will not list them one by one. 
Meanwhile, the negative effects of globalization also began to spread. Especially 
since the 1990s, China began to experience outward pressure due to its vigorous 
economy, and people and capital permeated into neighboring countries over the 
border. The advance of Chinese people and capital was welcomed on the one hand, 
while it was regarded as a threat on the other. The same situation emerged in Russia, 
Central Asia and South East Asia, including countries such as Myanmar, Laos and 
Cambodia. As a result, from the Chinese standpoint, it has become a major theme of 
its omnidirectional diplomacy to combat the China threat theory, not only in Japan and 
Western countries but throughout the world. 
Also, the financial crisis of 2008 originating in the US deeply affected the Chinese 
economy as China increased its links with the global economy. The rise of China 
itself had already caused serious strains. Following the burst of the stock market 
bubble and soaring prices in 2007, there was an abrupt cooling down of the economy 
in 2008, when the financial crisis hit China. China seemed to hit a turning point in its 
development. However, the world still counts on China’s growth in order to get out of 
the global recession. China’s export industries were hardly hit, but a massive economic 
stimulus package since the fall of 2008 which amounted to 4 trillion yuan was effective 
in pulling China out of the crisis. In 2009, China’s GDP was 4.99 trillion dollars, up 
9.2% from the previous year. In 2010, it reached 5.88 trillion dollars, up 10.3% from 
the previous year and China became the world’s second largest economy overtaking 
Japan.1
This article aims to answer the following three questions to unravel the complex 
1 China’s basic economic indices presented by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) at <http://
www.jetro.go.jp/world/asia/cn/stat_01/> (searched date: 20 April 2012).
49The Rise of China and Its Neighborhood Diplomacy
situation and consider the future course of Japan. First, what is the reality of the so-
called rise of China? This section examines the current situation of the Chinese 
society in terms of its stability and sustainability of growth. Second, how did China’s 
neighborhood diplomacy change as a result of its rise? What is China trying to 
achieve with its increasing presence in the world as a regional power, and how? Third, 
considering the future prospect of China’s neighborhood diplomacy, what kind of 
neighborhood diplomacy should Japan adopt? All of these are challenging questions 
that require deep contemplation, and this paper attempts to provide preliminary answers 
to them. 
1. The Reality of the Rise of China 
China is rising and seems to have a high potential for further growth although it also 
has to deal with social strains unleashed by the rapid growth. However, high economic 
growth is starting to show signs of slowing down and there is a risk that this will 
threaten social stability in some parts. 
High Economic Growth and the Resulting Achievements ((( 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy is widely known, so this paper will not 
describe it in detail. The GDP in 2009 and 2010 were as mentioned above, and per 
capita GDP figures for each year were 3,739 dollars in 2009 and 4,283 dollars in 
2010. These figures are far less than that of Japan which was at 42,782 dollars (2010),2 
although China’s pace of growth is fast.3 Also, its exports amounted to 1.4285 trillion 
dollars in 2008, up 17.2% from the previous year, and its trade surplus in the same 
year reached 295.4 billion dollars,4 up 12.5% from the previous year, rivaling that of 
Germany. Furthermore, in terms of the amount of foreign currency reserves, China 
overtook Japan and has been ranked first since February of 2006. 
After the second Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Deng Xiaoping once said 
the government could stabilize the nation because it “implemented the reform and 
opening-up policy and improved people’s lives by promoting economic development”.5 
The high economic growth certainly improved people’s lives and this served as an 
essential factor to stabilize the Chinese society. For example, the amount of residential 
2 Japan’s figure is based on data by the Cabinet Office, presented at <http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/
h19-kaku/percapita.pdf> (searched date: 22 April 2012).
3 The goal announced in the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2007 was to 
quadruple per capita GDP from 2000 to 2020. 
4  “Data Room,” JC Economic Journal, No. 187 (August 2009), p. 43.
5 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disan Juan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3] 
(Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993), p. 371.
50 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.1, No.1
space per person in cities and villages doubled from 13.7 square meters and 17.8 square 
meters respectively in 1990 to 27.1 square meters and 30.7 square meters respectively 
in 2006.6 Also, the number of color television owned per 100 households in cities and 
villages increased from 59.0 and 4.7 respectively in 1990 to 137.8 and 94.4 respectively 
in 2007. The number of personal computer owned per 100 households in cities and 
villages increased from 9.7 and 0.5 respectively in 2000 to 53.8 and 3.7 respectively in 
2007. 
Because China is large and the division of social strata is deepening, it is not 
appropriate to describe all of China in terms of averages. However, it is also true 
that many Chinese people actually feel that their living standards are improving. The 
Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had conducted a 
large scale general survey on social conditions in 2006 and 2008.7 According to the 
survey, the ratio of those who feel improvement in the living standards was 63.4% in 
2006, and it reached 69.4% in 2008. In the survey of both years, the ratio of those who 
feel improvement in the living standards was higher in villages than in cities, and the 
difference was 13 points in 2006 and 14.5 points in 2008, which might be the result 
of the village development policy implemented by the party.8 Although people are 
dissatisfied with their local governments for environment pollution and corruption, 
their satisfaction generally outweighs their dissatisfaction.9 The regime has been 
securing its legitimacy by providing growth, and this kind of developmentalism is 
effective on a basic level for now. 
The Strains of High Economic Growth ((( 
However, China’s developmentalism is creating serious problems at the same time. 
This is also widely known, so this paper will not explain this in detail, but conspicuous 
examples include the widening income disparity, an underdeveloped social security 
system, a series of incidents regarding the safety of food and medication, worsening 
environmental pollution and intensifying conflicts of interest. 
The General Social Survey by the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences shows that the average income of the top 20th percentile per-capita 
income households was as 17.1 times as that of the lowest 20th percentile households 
in 2007. Also, in regional comparison, the per capita income of households in the 
6 The data is this paragraph is based on: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical 
Abstract 2008 (Bejing: China Statistics Press, 2008), p. 100.
7 For the results of the survey see: Xin Ru, Xueyi Lu, Peilin Li, eds., 2009 Zhongguo Shehui Xingshi 
Fenxi Yu Yuce [Society of China Analysis and Forecast 2009], (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic 
Press, 2008). 
8 Peilin Li, Wei Li “2008 Zhongguo Minsheng Wenti Diaocha Baogao” [Report on a 2008 Survey on 
Quality of Life for Chinese Residents], in Ru, Lu, Li, op. cit., p. 17. The ratio of village residents who 
replied that the living standards improved was 69% in 2006 and 76.3% in 2008.
9 Ibid., p. 30. 
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Eastern region was 2.03 times that of Western region and 1.98 times that of the Central 
region. Residential space per person and ownership of durable consumer goods such 
as automobiles, microwaves and refrigerators largely depended upon the amount of 
income.10
According to the survey, the unemployment rate in cities reached 9.4%, and 
85% of the unemployed were young and middle aged people from 18 to 49 years 
old.11 In particular, it reached 10.4% and 11.7% in the Central and Western regions, 
respectively. In terms of social groups, a salient problem is the job scarcity that new 
college graduates are facing. It was estimated that around 1.5 million new college 
graduates out of 5.59 million graduates in 2008 would not find a job by the end of the 
year.12 Another major problem after the world financial crisis was the lack of jobs for 
so-called migrant workers. Many export-based companies were forced to go bankrupt 
or lay off workers amid the global recession, which was triggered by the subprime 
mortgage crisis in the US. The number of migrant workers who had lost jobs was 
estimated to be 20 million as of the Chinese new year of 2009, but the job creation 
target for the same year was only nine million.13 Despite the dire employment situation 
in general, only 20.7% people had unemployment insurance in cities (data by region is 
not available). By comparison, the percentage of those who had endowment insurance 
and health insurance were 52.7% and 58.7% respectively in cities, and only 5.7% had 
social endowment insurance in villages. In cities and villages, the ratio of those who 
feel “living pressure” because “family members are not employed, they lost a job or are 
in an unstable employment situation”, was as high as 38.43%, up 8.37 points compared 
to the survey in 2006.
Safety issues concerning food and medication have long existed, but they drew 
attention in Japan when the incident of toxic dumplings occurred in 2008. In the same 
10 Ibid., pp. 19-20. For example, the residential area per person of the lowest 20th percentile income 
households in mid to large cities was 19.1 square meters while that of the top 20th percentile income 
households was 36.6 square meters, almost double the former. Also, the refrigerator ownership rate 
of the former group was 22.75% while that of the latter was 87.5%. The microwave ownership was 
3.95% and 60.36% and the automobile ownership was 2.53% and 18.79%, respectively.
11 Ibid., pp. 22, 23. The official unemployment rate was only 4.2% because the figure does not 
include unregistered unemployed people. 
12 Peilin Li, Guangjin Chen, “Liwankuanglan: Zhongguo Shehui Fazhan Yingjie Xintiaozhan” 
[Stopping the Rough Tide: Chinese Social Development Faces a New Challenge] in Ru, Lu, Li, op. 
cit., p. 8. 
13 Tatsuo Kotoyori, “20 Million Peasants Lost Jobs, Returning Home,” Asahi Shimbun (3 February 
2009). According to Xiwen Chen, deputy head of the central rural work leading group, six to 
seven million farmers become migrant workers every year in addition to 20 million workers, so it 
is necessary to provide jobs and improved living standards to stabilize rural areas: Xinwen Chen, 
“Zhongguo Chuli Tu Fa Xing Qunti Shijian Yuanze Shang Bu Shiyong Jingli,” [In Principle China 
Does Not Use Police Force in Handling Sudden Mass Incidents] Xinhua Net (2 February 2009) at 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-02/02/content_10750736.htm> (searched date: 3 February 
2009). 
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year, approximately 50,000 babies in China developed kidney stones after they had 
powdered baby formula with a few of them dying, sending shock waves throughout 
the society. The producer watered down milk in the production process of powdered 
formula, and they mixed in melamine, which contains nitrogen just as proteins do, 
in order to cover it up. This was the cause of the incident. Incidents concerning toxic 
powdered baby formula happened in 2003 and 2004 as well, but the authorities were 
unable to prevent its recurrence.
Environment pollution and ecosystem destruction show no sign of ending. According 
to a report in 2008, pollution is occurring not only in surface water but also in the 
groundwater of more than 100 mid-to-large cities in the country.14 Cities are suffering 
from complex air pollution of smoke and exhaust gas, which worsens visibility by 
creating highly concentrated particles with increased oxidation capacity. Soil and 
agricultural products are also polluted as a result of irrigation with contaminated water 
and the long-term use of a large quantity of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and other 
chemical products such as plastic sheets. Some estimate that 20 million hectres, or 
one fifth of the total farming land is polluted. Furthermore, more than 20 inland lakes 
disappear every year, and more than 70 cities experience ground sinking caused by 
excessive use of ground water for development. 
Various kinds of strain caused by the high economic growth are creating many 
conflicts of interest in the society. In particular, the number of labor disputes and 
conflicts related to land seizure, forced relocation for development, privatization of 
corporations and environment pollution is increasing.15 The number of petitions and 
letters was 810,000 in 2007, but it reached 900,000 in 2008 as of September. So-
called quntixing shijian (collective disturbances) increased from about 60,000 to 
80,000 between 2006 and 2008.16 In Guangdong province, where export industries 
were stagnant, collective disturbances arising from labor conflicts concerning the delay 
or neglect of payment accounted for 50% of the total from January to September in 
2008.17 Among so-called “security cases”, which include property destruction and 
14 Based on Shihui Yan, Yong Qian “2008 Huanjing Baohu Xingshi” [The Situation of 
Environmental Protection 2008] in Ru, Lu, Li, op. cit., pp. 217-218. 
15 Peilin Li, Guangjin Chen, “Liwankuanglan: Zhongguo Shehui Fazhan Yingjie Xin Tiaozhan” 
[Stopping the Rough Tide: Chinese Social Development Faces a New Challenge], in Ru, Lu, Li, op. 
cit., p. 10. This paragraph is based on this reference unless otherwise mentioned. 
16 The definition of “collective disturbances” is not clear and there was also an announcement 
that the number of riots in 2005 was 87,000. A top official of the Shanghai Public Security 
Office defines it as follows: a collective disturbance is “an act of threatening public and 
private property and the safety of citizens, threatening public safety, confusing the social 
order, and violating laws and regulations by 10 or more people.”, cited in: Takeshi Watanabe, 
“Dai 1 Sho Chowa Shakai to Toshibu ni Okeru ‘Guntaisei Jiken’ [Chapter 1: Harmonious 
Society and ‘Collective Disturbances’ in Urban Areas], in Tomohiro Sasaki, Gendai Chugoku 
no Seijiteki Antei Sei [Political Stability of Modern China], Ajiken Sensho [Selected Papers 
of the Institute of Developing Economies], No. 17 (2009), p. 15. 
17 Erdong Song, Congbing Yan, “2008 Nian Shehui Zhian Xingshi” [The State of Public Order in 
2008], in Ru, Lu, Li, op. cit., p. 203. The authors Song and Yan belong to the Statistics Bureau of the 
Ministry of Public Security. According to them, the major ways that workers use to communicate 
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fistfight arising from private conflicts, the ones mediated by the police reached 2.398 
million cases between January and November in 2008, up 31.1% from the same term 
last year.18
It was pointed out from early on that a fall in economic growth without political 
reform and improvement in the interest adjustment system would cause societal 
contradictions to surface in a violent way. The focus of discussion can be nailed down 
to the following two questions in light of social stability. First, will China force through 
political reform? Second, will China’s economic growth continue? 
Concerns about the Future ((( 
Political reform has been stagnant except for basic-level elections (the election of 
members of autonomous committees stipulated by the constitution such as village 
committees and urban residents committees) since the second Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989. However, political reform is constantly studied and discussed within 
the Chinese Communist Party and this is sometimes revealed to the general public. 
For example, some research institutes directly under the Party Center such as the 
Central Party School and the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau have many 
researchers who are engaged in bold studies of political reform. Yu Keping, vice 
director of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, published an interview 
compilation titled “Democracy is a Good Thing” which drew public attention.19Also, 
“Charter 08”, which called for the realization of freedom, equality and human rights, 
was released on the internet on Human Rights Day, December 10th of 2008. The 
original 303 signers included scholars, lawyers, business people, laborers and farmers. 
Du Guang, former vice director of the Theoretical Research Office of the Central Party 
School, was one of them. He used to be a member of the Political System Reform 
Study Group, the office of which was located in the Central Party School following 
the presentation of the blueprint of political reform in the 13th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China in 1987.
However, in reality there is no sign that Hu Jintao and the leaders are 
wholeheartedly promoting political reform. They seem to think that a major 
solution to address the problems should be control by force, and not systemic 
reform, which could cause confusion and affect social stability that had become 
the supreme goal for the government now. Liu Xiaobo, a prominent pro-
democracy activist regarded as one of the leaders of “Chapter 08”, was detained. 
He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010. The authorities started to shut 
down many blogs under the guise of cracking down on obscene websites in 
their dissatisfaction and requests are group petitions, disruption of transportation by groups, and 
strikes. 
18 Bureau of Security Management, Ministry of Public Security, 2008 Nian Zhian Guangli Gongzuo 
Huigu [Review of Security Management Work in 2008]” at <http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1252/
n1657/n2062/1780186.html> (searched date: 1 February 2009). The increase in mediation activities 
of regional public security offices accounts for another factor in the increase of recorded incidents. 
19 Jian Yan, Democracy is a Good Thing – Yu Keping Fangtanlu [Democracy is a Good thing – Yu 
Keping Interview] (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2006).
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early January 2009, saying that this is a “special activity to fix corrupted internet 
morals”. They keep promising to continuously promote political reform, and respect 
and guarantee human rights.20 However, the reality is that they only let people vent 
some frustration as social dissatisfaction mounts while they do not hesitate to hold up 
political reforms and suppress human rights at their own convenience. 
Why then did political reforms not take place despite the fact that the economy had 
been thriving until 2007? The reason is likely because the leadership did not think the 
need for reform outweighed the risk, and the underlying cause of this is the collusion 
between political powers (party leaders) and economic powers (business leaders) who 
are afraid of losing their vested interests through political reform.21 Marketization 
under a one party dictatorship led to a spread of bribery and corruption, and to the 
close, collaborative relationship between power and money.
However, whether the Communist Party can avert the eruption of dissatisfaction 
about the societal contradictions depends on the future of economic growth. No doubt 
the Chinese society still has much room for industrialization, urbanization and a high 
potential for growth as the authorities insist. However, the aging population will loom 
as an even more serious issue in the future, in addition to the constraints on energy 
and the environment. Voices calling for political reform will swell both in the party 
and society sooner or later as conflicts of interest become more prevalent and taxpayer 
awareness grows. It is not guaranteed that this reform will happen in a peaceful manner. 
China’s rise probably will continue if we took a long-term perspective. However, it will 
move onto a stable trajectory only after a period of substantial political reform. 
2. Relations between China and Neighboring Countries 
    after the Cold War 
A China’s rise has generally contributed to strengthening the relationship with its 
neighbors. The opening up of the economy was further promoted in the late 1970s 
after the end of the Cultural Revolution, and Deng Xiaoping and other leaders took 
advantage of the economic power of the ethnic Chinese in neighboring countries. 
The Special Economic Zones which symbolized the opening-up at the beginning 
were established in view of connections with the ethnic Chinese outside of mainland 
China. In the beginning of the 1990s, China lost relations with socialist regimes of 
20 Hu Jintao, “Zai Jinian Dangde Shiyi jie Sanzhong Quanhui Zhaokai Sanshizhounian Dahuishang 
de Jianghua” [In Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CPC], People’s Daily (19 December 2008).
21 Many Chinese believe that the political elite, economic elite and academic elite “have formed 
an agreement and are in alliance,” cited in Xiaoguang Kang, “Weilai San Wu nian Zhongguo Dalu 
Zhengzhi Wendingxing Fenxi” [Analysis on Political Stability of Mainland China for the Coming 3 
to 5 Years] Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], Vol. 3 (2003), p. 1.
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Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union despite efforts to improve those relations, and 
simultaneously faced economic sanctions from Western countries because the end of 
the Cold War and the second Tiananmen Square Incident took place almost at the same 
time. In order to come out of international isolation, China started to reestablish its 
diplomacy by improving its relations with the neighboring countries. 
However, the rise of China after the Cold War, coupled with globalization, brought 
changes to its relations with the neighboring countries. This section discusses how 
China has developed its diplomatic and trade relations with the neighboring countries 
since the 1990s, and investigates its goals and dynamics from the Chinese perspective. 
The neighboring countries here refer not only to East Asian countries including North 
East Asian and South East Asian countries but also to Central Asian and South Asian 
countries in some cases. 
Development of China’s Neighborhood Diplomacy – Until the Middle of the ((( 
(990s
With the backdrop of isolation brought about by economic sanctions after the second 
Tiananmen Square incident and the collapse of the socialist camp in East Europe and 
the Soviet Union, China tried to strengthen exchanges with the third world countries, 
especially with East Asian countries which were showing remarkable economic 
growth. It proposed shelving the territorial disputes and jointly developing offshore 
oilfields in the South China Sea in 1991, and succeeded in normalizing diplomatic 
relations with Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei and South Korea by 1992. China 
also approached Japan to break through the “allied front of western sanctions against 
China” as it saw Japan as the weakest link of this alliance, and realized the 1992 visit 
by the Japanese Emperor to China for the first time in history.22 Further, as Deng 
Xiaoping’s “remarks during the Southern Tour” in 1992 accelerated the reform and 
opening-up policy, China entered a period of rapid economic growth that activated 
economic exchanges with foreign countries throughout the world.
However, a problem occurred in the realm of security. In the beginning of 1992, 
China enacted the Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and cited the 
names of all the disputed islands in the East and the South China Seas as its own 
territory. It also declared that it would exercise military force against those who 
violated its territorial waters. In the same year, it changed the policy on military build-
ups in order to catch up with changes in international circumstances and improvements 
in military technology, and adjusted its military strategy. A main point of the 
adjustment was to include maintaining a peaceful maritime environment and defending 
its maritime interests in its basic duties, aiming at substantially expanding its defense 
22 Qian Qichen, Trans. Ryoichi Hamamoto, Qian Qichen Kaikoroku Chugoku Gaiko 20 Nen no 
Shogen [Memoirs of Qian Qichen – Testimony of China’s 20 Years Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Toyo Shoin, 
2006), p. 185. 
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zone and space. Although China did propose to shelve the disputes, internally it 
decided not to rule out local war or small scale military clashes depending on how the 
adversaries acted, choosing the best timing from the military, political and diplomatic 
points of view for a swift and decisive victory.23 In February 1995, it was discovered 
that China had quietly occupied Mischief Reef and built a structure there, despite the 
fact that the Philippines had been claiming its territorial right over it. This incident 
could be said to have been brought on by the implementation of the above policy and 
strategy. 
In the following month, foreign ministers of ASEAN issued a joint statement strongly 
calling to the related countries for the suspension of any action threatening the peace 
and security of the South China Sea. Some ASEAN countries even began to welcome 
the presence of US forces in the South East Asia since the first half of the 1990s 
when the regional order after the Cold War was not clear.24 Meanwhile, an increase in 
economic activities in China brought more goods, money and people to neighboring 
countries. This resulted not only in increased economic exchanges but also in conflicts 
with local residents in Far East Russia, Mongolia and former Soviet countries in 
Central Asia with small populations, as well as in South East Asian countries such as 
Myanmar and Vietnam.25 Also, the identity of the ethnic Chinese was strengthened 
because the economic exchanges with China were conducted mainly through the 
network of ethnic Chinese and this caused mistrust towards the ethnic Chinese in some 
countries.26
Another big issue of the East Asian security order then was the relationship between 
mainland China and Taiwan. Taiwan engaged in vigorous diplomacy under the 
leadership of President Lee Tenghui. President Lee Tenghui and Premier Lian Chan 
visited East Asian countries and communicated with the leaders during their vacation 
23 Akio Takahara, “‘Chugoku Kyoiron’ wo Umu Chukasekai no Kakucho to Atsureki,” [The 
expansion and conflicts of Chinese World that Cause the ‘China Threat Theory’] Gaiko Forum 
[Journal of Japanese Perspectives on Foreign Affairs] Vol. 68, No. 5 (May, 1994), pp. 50-51. The 
new military strategy was established in 1993. “The changes in international circumstances and 
improvement in military technology” refers to the end of the Cold War and economic sanctions 
against China, and the advance of military technology demonstrated by the US forces in the Gulf 
War in 1991. 
24 Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “Sino-ASEAN Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century”, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, No.3 (December 2001), p. 438.
25 The details about the immigrants to the Russian Far East are described in Olga Alexeeva, 
“Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East: A Historical and Sociodemographic Analysis”, China 
Perspectives, No. 3 (2008), pp. 20-32. As a result of free travel over the borders between China 
and Russia from 1992 to 1994, 500,000 and 750,000 Chinese went to Russia in 1992 and 1993 
respectively, and the number of Chinese residents in the Russian Far East reached between 50,000 
and 100,000 during that time. The Yellow Peril Theory prevailed in the Russian Far East. In the 
survey conducted in the 1990s, 26% of the respondents said China is a threat. 
26 Takahara, “‘Chugoku Kyoiron’ wo Umu Chukasekai no Kakucho to Atsureki,” pp. 52-53. In the 
early 1990s, the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention was established under the initiative of 
Singapore to provide an occasion for Chinese business people to gather and extend their network. 
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from 1993 to 1994, and in addition, Lee Tenghui visited the US in 1995. Meanwhile, 
the security cooperation between Japan and the United States was redefined around the 
same time.27 It was said that the greatest threat for China in terms of security was the 
hegemony and power politics of the US, especially the intervention by US forces in 
case of a war in the Taiwan Strait.28 As Taiwan’s democratization advanced and the first 
presidential election was held in 1996, China conducted successive nuclear tests and 
a missile test to exert pressure on the election. However, China’s image as a hardliner 
was emphasized as a result of these actions, which inadvertently helped Lee Tenghui 
get elected and created tensions in China's relations with Japan.29 
As for the East Asian security order after the Cold War, ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) was established in 1994 by the suggestion of several countries such as ASEAN 
member states, Japan and Australia. One of the important aims was to integrate China, 
the regional “giant”, into the multilateral framework and regulate its actions. They 
tried to reapply the “Gulliver approach” which was used previously when small states 
got together to pressure a big state, Indonesia, to join in the creation of ASEAN.30 
However, China was merely an inactive participant in the beginning. Possible reasons 
are as follows: it was wary that the conflict with Taiwan, which China insisted to 
be an internal issue, might become the topic of discussion; it wanted to resolve the 
disputes in the South China Sea through bilateral negotiations in which China has a 
bigger advantage; and it was afraid that great powers such as the US and Japan would 
dominate the process of decision making. If this observation is correct, this means that 
China was reluctant to participate in the regional multilateral framework due to its 
position as a regional power and a developing nation at the same time. 
In summary, China successfully came out of isolation after the second Tiananmen 
Square incident, and developed economic relationships with its neighbors, including 
Taiwan, in large scale by the advancement in its reform and opening-up policy since 
1992 and the rapid economic growth that ensued. However, at the same time, the 
China threat theory gradually spread partly because China exhibited and exercised its 
military power. Also, Japan and the United States chose to strengthen the alliance in the 
process of constructing the East Asian order after the threat from the Soviet Union 
disappeared at the end of the Cold War. The outbreak of the first nuclear crisis 
27 The first Korean nuclear crisis occurred in 1993/1994. Japan and the US emphasized that the 
redefined Japan-US security agreement does not focus on China, but China was hardly convinced.
28 This paragraph is based on Akio Takahara, “Chugokuno Shin Anzen Hoshokanto Chiiki Seisaku” 
[China’s New Security Concept and Regional Policies], in Akio Igarashi, ed., Higashi Ajia Anzenhosho 
no Shintenkai [New Developments in East Asia Security] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005), p. 198. 
29 Japan suspended grant aid to China from August 1995 to February 1997 in protest against the 
repeated nuclear tests. According to annual public opinion polls conducted by the Prime Minister’s 
Office (the current Cabinet Office), the percentage of people who have positive sentiments towards 
China was at its lowest point in 1996 at 45.0% since the start of the survey in the 1980s and 2003. 
30 Tatsumi Okabe, “Learning to Survive with ‘Gulliver’”, The World Today, Vol. 52, No. 6 (June 1996).
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in the Korean Peninsula prompted this movement. As a result, China was stuck 
in a situation where it could be forced into isolation and excluded in East Asia 
both politically and strategically. Neighboring countries were alarmed not only 
because of the past experience of the “export of revolution” and long-standing 
ethnic conflicts between the ethnic Chinese and local residents, but also because 
China was outstandingly large and rapidly developing. That is, China started to 
face the “dilemma between development and peace”.
((( Breaking Out of Isolation – New Security Concept and Promotion of         
Multilateral Diplomacy in the Region31
A new element was added to China’s diplomacy since the latter half of the 1990s. 
China began to actively engage in constructing a multilateral framework with 
neighboring countries from the viewpoint of cooperative security and comprehensive 
security under the name of the “New Security Concept”. China was driven to develop 
a new foreign policy line because it needed to break out of international isolation and 
because globalization created multidimensional and transnational threats to national 
security. 
Progress was first made in relationships with former Soviet states on the west of 
China. What China called the New Security Concept was developed on two Sino-
Russian joint statements in April 1996 and April 1997, and had mostly matured by 
1999.32 For example, the joint Sino-Russian joint statement in 1997 included the 
following words: 
Both sides (China and Russia) stand for the establishment of a new and universally 
applicable security concept, believing that the “Cold War mentality” must be aban-
doned…The differences or disputes between states must be settled through peace-
ful means without resorting to the use or threat of force. Dialogue and consultation 
should be pursued to promote mutual understanding and build confidence and peace, 
and security should be sought through coordination and cooperation at a bilateral or 
multilateral level. 
Jiang Zemin insisted that the old security concept based on military alliances and 
relying on military build-ups would not help international security, a seeming reference 
to the US-Japan alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).33 He 
31 This section is largely based on Akio Takahara, “Chugokuno Shin Anzen Hoshokan to Chiiki 
Seisaku,” pp. 199-207. 
32 Ryo Asano, “Chugoku no Anzenhosho Seisaku ni Naizai Suru Ronri to Henka” [Logic and 
Change in China’s Security Policy], Kokusai Mondai, (January 2003), pp. 18-23; Seiichiro Takagi, 
“Chugoku no ‘Shin Anzen Hoshokan’” [China’s ‘New Security Concept’], Boei Kenkyujo Kiyo 
[Bulletin of the National Institute for Defense Studies] (March 2003), p.74 .
33 Jiang Zemin, “Jianli Shiying Shidai Xuyao de Xinanquanguan” [Establishing a New Security 
Concept Applicable to the Need of New Times] 26 March 1999 Speech at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva, Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Di Er Juan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin Volume 
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argued that the core of the New Security Concept is mutual trust, mutual benefits, 
equality and cooperation, and that this concept was represented by the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, the organization founded based on the so-called Shanghai 
Five. The Shanghai Five was started in the Treaty of Deepening Military Trust in 
Border Regions (Shanghai Treaty) signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan in April 1996 after the new nations were born as a result of the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Its functions were extended to include security in the 
border region, economic cooperation and joint action against international terrorism. 
Uzbekistan joined in June 2001 and the Shanghai Five developed into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. 
Meanwhile, in East Asia, China’s attitude in the ARF gradually changed after the 
issuance of a joint statement by ASEAN foreign ministries and the occurrence of the 
Mischief Reef incident in 1995. Namely, China co-chaired the Inter-sessional Support 
Group on Confidence Building Measures with the Philippines in 1996. In 1997, it 
even insisted that the ARF should play a central role in maintaining regional stability 
although this was in the context of criticizing the strengthened US-Japan alliance.34 
The financial crisis that hit East Asia in 1997 raised awareness among countries of 
the region of the importance of regional cooperation in protecting themselves from 
the risk of globalization. China was no exception. It is true that China did not support 
the idea of an Asia Monetary Fund submitted by Japan in September 1997. However, 
Chinese leaders became involved in a battle with investment capital over Hong Kong 
dollars and seemed to deepen its understanding about the seriousness of the situation 
and the need for regional cooperation during the fall and the winter. In December of the 
same year, vice premier Qian Qichen stated that the financial crisis illuminated the fact 
that economic security is an important element and recognized the need to strengthen 
financial cooperation with the region and the world.35 Since then, the concept of 
comprehensive security, in which not only national defense but also economy, finance, 
energy and environment are related to national security, began to spread in China. 
The immediate goal set at that time was to jointly prevent the attack of international 
investment capital. However, the financial crisis in Asia prompted China to conceive 
of the idea that the risk of globalization, which could threaten overall national security, 
should be hedged by multilateral regional cooperation. Also, China did not drive down 
the value of the RMB during the Asian Financial Crisis contrary to expectations from 
inside and outside the country and this was praised by neighboring countries and by 
the US. China seemed to be the only winner in this situation because it was not 
2] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House), p. 313. 
34 Yoshihide Soeya, “ASEAN Chiiki Foramu To Chugoku [ASEAN Regional Forum and China], in 
Seiichiro Takagi, ed., Datsu Reisenki no Chugokugaiko to Ajia Taiheiyo [China’s Diplomacy after the 
Cold War and the Asia-Pacific] (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2000). 
35 People’s Daily (16 December 1997). 
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directly hit by the impact of the financial crisis thanks to the delay in liberalization, 
and it gained confidence as a responsible regional great power. 
China began to take specific actions in creating the framework of East Asian regional 
economic cooperation in 1999. In November that year, it proposed the permanent 
establishment of meetings between the Finance Ministry deputies and the central 
bank deputies, which had initially been proposed and held the previous year. China 
also agreed for the first time to hold a summit meeting between Japan, South Korea 
and China. In November 2000, it agreed to regularly hold the summit meeting and 
proposed the establishment of a free trade zone with ASEAN in the ASEAN Plus One 
(China) summit. On the same occasion, ASEAN also proposed a free trade agreement 
with Japan, China and South Korea. However, China and ASEAN eventually agreed to 
start negotiations aimed at establishing the free trade zone within 10 years (15 years for 
countries which joined ASEAN at later stages) in the same meeting of the following 
year, 2001, as a result of China’s thorough and unobtrusive groundwork. While China 
engaged itself in cooperative measures among ASEAN plus three such as a currency 
swap agreement, it managed to sign on the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China in 2002.36 The agreement included 
China’s removal of tariffs in 2003 for agricultural products for which ASEAN 
countries have a competitive advantage and the provision of economic support for 
ASEAN. Also, China offered to write off debts owed to China by ASEAN countries. 
All of these ideas and measures were part of an attempt to combat the China threat 
theory by creating a “win-win” mechanism in which other countries can benefit from 
China’s development through the establishment of free trade zones and the promotion 
of regional cooperation. 
The reason China inclined further to regionalism in 1999 was probably the instabil-
ity of its relationship with the US. Jiang Zemin made an exclusive visit to the US for 9 
days in 1997 and Clinton in return made a 9-day exclusive visit to China in the follow-
ing year. Sino-US relations seemed to hit its peak. However, in 1999, NATO intervened 
militarily in the Kosovo Conflict under the name of protecting human rights, and China 
was strongly opposed to it. Premier Zhu Rongji visited the US in April for the negotia-
tion of its WTO accession, but it ended with humiliating failure. The US not only re-
jected the compromise proposed by Zhu, it even revealed the proposal on the internet. 
The worst was the “accidental bombing” of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia by an 
American bomber in May. At this point, China fully understood that the relationship 
with the US would not be easy and therefore became more inclined to regionalism 
in East Asia. Its aims included securing a basis of support and room for maneuver in 
neighboring countries in order to avoid containment led by the US, and increasing the 
36 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of 
South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China at <http://www.aseansec.org/13197.
htm> (searched date: 25 December 2002). 
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influence of East Asia against North America and Europe which were in the process of 
the regional integration. 
Thus, China began to accept the concept of cooperative security and comprehensive 
security in the latter half of the 1990s and actively engaged in the establishment of 
a multilateral framework with neighboring countries based on this concept since the 
end of the 1990s. In the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China, this policy 
was formulated as “Yulinweishan, Yilinweiban” (taking in neighbors as friends and 
partners). This was a significant change in concept as the partnership with neighboring 
countries was not limited to bilateral relations but also was conceived of as a multilat-
eral framework. In addition to ARF and ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and South 
Korea), China accepted the idea of six party talks to resolve the nuclear issue in the 
Korean Peninsula since the fall of 2002 and made strenuous efforts to finally realize it. 
It joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2003, and agreed 
in 2006 to upgrade a Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea signed in 2002 
to a Code of Conduct. Also, it held joint exercises with countries such as Thailand, the 
US and Pakistan from 2006 to 2007 under the scenario of a joint response against non-
traditional threats including marine terrorism, drug rings and search and rescue opera-
tions.37 
However, it should be noted that while China pursues to establish the framework 
of cooperative security in its diplomacy, it is putting much effort into modernizing its 
military equipment. In November, 1999, Jiang Zemin stated as follows. “At the Party 
center, I repeatedly said that the state should consider the need of national defense and 
military build-up in fiscal expenditure. The state has made the utmost effort to increase 
expenditure on the military in the past few years.”38 Although Jiang Zemin denied the 
“old concept of security”, it was not abandoned in reality. Also, China shows no sign of 
compromising on issues that involve its sovereignty. In 2007, Hainan Provincial Gov-
ernment established Sansha city in 2007, to administer the region including the Paracel 
Islands (Xisha Islands in Chinese and Hoangsa Islands in Vietnamese), the Spratly 
Islands (Nansha Islands in Chinese and Truongsa Islands in Vietnamese) and the Mac-
clesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands in Chinese) and faced protests from Vietnam.39 
At any rate, China’s presence in the region has grown as a result of its rise and good 
neighbor diplomacy. Exports from China to East Asian countries increased from 182.5 
billion dollars in 2000 to 423.6 billion dollars in 2006. Exports from East Asia to China 
increased from 139.8 billion dollars in 2000 to 389 billion dollars in 2006. In terms of 
37 Koichi Sato, “Tai Tonan Ajia Rengo Shokoku Kankei” [Relations with ASEAN Countries], 
in Chugoku Soran Henshu Iinkai, Chugoku Soran 2007-2008 Ban [China Directory 2007-2008] 
(Tokyo: Gyosei, 2008), pp. 191-192. 
38 Jiang, “Shinianlai Junwei Gongzuo de Huigu he Zongjie” [Retrospect and Summary of 10 Years 
Work of the Military Commission], in Jiang, op. cit., p. 465.
39 Sato, “Tai Tonan Ajia Rengo Shokoku Kankei,” p. 191.
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the ratio, the percentage of exports from East Asia to China grew from 10.0% of the 
total to 21.9%.40 On the other hand, China’s investment in the region is relatively small. 
For example, while investment from ASEAN to China was 3.36 billion dollars in 2006 
(Singapore accounted for 2.26 billion dollars), investment from China to ASEAN was 
only about 200 million dollars. Thus, ASEAN urged China for more investment at the 
ASEAN-China summit in November 2007 and this was reflected in the chairman’s 
statement.41 However, China actively engages in economic cooperation by means of 
resource development and the construction of roads and other infrastructure under the 
framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Greater Mekong Sub-region 
Economic Cooperation.42 Based on a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs in 2008, China was considered in Japan, the US, China and South Korea 
to have more economic influence than Japan although Japan was considered to be more 
influential in Indonesia and Vietnam.43 China is thought to be effectively gaining influ-
ence by providing military assistance to foreign countries although the figures are not 
disclosed.44 
China is developing its neighboring diplomacy multilaterally in all directions in 
order to obtain markets and resources, to contain the China threat theory, to secure its 
room for maneuver and to gain political influence. Many neighboring countries wel-
come China’s active engagement in the establishment of a multilateral framework, and 
although they are alarmed about the risk of the rise of a regional power, they are trying 
to take advantage of it. As is well known, Japan is no exception. 
3. Japan’s Response 
In view of the rise of China and its neighboring diplomacy discussed above, what kind 
of diplomatic policy should Japan adopt? First, we will review the development of Ja-
pan’s diplomacy with China in the context of regional policy after the Cold War. 
Japan had the idea of seeing China within the framework of East Asia and the Asia-
40 The above statistics are based on Yoshiaki Miyajima, Keiichiro Oizumi, “Chugoku no Taito to 
Higashi Ajia Ikinai Boeki World Trade Atlas (1996-2006) no Bunseki Kara” [The rise of China 
and East Asia Regional Trade Based on the Analysis of World Trade Atlas (1996-2006)], Gendai 
Chugoku Kenkyu Kyoten Kenkyu [University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science, Contemporary 
Chinese Studies], No.1 (March 2008). 
41 Sato, “Tai Tonan Ajia Rengo Shokoku Kankei,” pp. 194-195. 
42 The website of the ASEAN-Japan centre shows detailed statistics about the economic relations 
between ASEAN countries and other countries including China and Japan at <http://www.asean.
or.jp/general/statistics/statistics08/index08.html> (searched date: 22 April 2012).
43 The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Asia Soft Power Survey 2008 at <http://www.
thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/Asia%20Soft%20Power%202008/
Chicago%20Council%20Soft%20Power%20Report-%20Final%206-11-08.pdf> (searched date: 20 
April 2012). 
44 Personal conversation with a government official in the region, November 2007. 
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Pacific from a relatively early stage. It was manifested in the speech of Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu who was the first leader of major countries to end the economic sanctions 
and visit China in the wake of the second Tiananmen Square incident. He stated that 
integrating the economic power of the Asia-Pacific region and the Chinese economy is 
meaningful for every country.45 Later, Japan and China agreed that “the stable relations 
among major countries in the Asia-Pacific region have great significance to the peace 
and stability of the region” during Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998.46 The joint 
press release issued at the same time clearly stated that both countries would enhance 
cooperation and partnership and play a constructive role for the peace and stability in 
the region.47 
China’s inclination to regionalism since 1999 was reflected in its foreign policy with 
Japan. In November 1999, China agreed for the first time to hold a Japan-China-South 
Korea trilateral summit along with ASEAN Plus Three. In September 2000, Jiang 
Zemin said in his meeting with Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori at the United Nations that 
the development of Asia cannot be achieved without the friendship and partnership 
between Japan and China. In the following month, during his visit to Japan, Zhu Rongji 
cited regional economic cooperation as one of the priority areas in the Japan-China 
partnership and declared that China hoped to strengthen cooperation with Japan under 
the framework of East Asia cooperation.48 However, China’s intention was not fully 
understood by Japan. Many Japanese had become introverted due to the long-stagnant 
economy. Also, specific declining industries were suffering from the surge of imports 
from China and started to cry for help.49
The pattern of partnership and competition between Japan and China became 
clear under the Koizumi administration that came into power in 2001. Prime Minister 
Koizumi, who proposed the creation of an East Asia community in January 2002, 
praised China’s attitude to take an active role in regional cooperation and said 
repeatedly that the rise of China is not a threat but an opportunity for Japan. After 
45 Kaifu’s speech is collected in Kazankai, ed., Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1947-1997 [Basic 
Materials of Japan China Relations 1947-1997] (Tokyo: Kazankai 1998), p. 770. Japan already 
insisted that the economic sanctions should be lifted for the same reason at the Houston summit in 
1990. 
46 Refer to  “Heiwa to Hatten no Tame no Yuko Kyoryoku Patonashippu no Kochiku ni Kansuru 
Nicchu Kyodo Sengen” [Japan-China joint statement to establish friendship and partnership for 
peace and development], in Kazankai, ed., Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1972-2008, [Basic 
Materials of Japan China Relations 1972 – 2008] (Kazankai 2008), p. 457. 
47 “Nicchu Ryogoku no 21 Seiki ni Muketa Kyoryoku Kyoka ni Kansuru Kyodo Puresu Happyo” 
[Joint Press Release on Strengthening the Partnership between Japan and China for the 21st 
Century], ibid., p. 465. 
48 Zhu Rongji described the Japan-China relations as “chun chi xiang yi” (as close as teeth and lips), 
which rarely happened in recent years, as this term is usually used to refer to China-North Korea 
relations. 
49 It was symbolic that a manufacturer of shiitake mushrooms called for an action in a TV program 
in which Zhu Rongji had a discussion with Japanese people. 
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China joined the WTO in late 2001, exports from Japan to China increased by 
28.2% in 2002, 43.6% in 2003 and 29.0% in 2004 compared to the previous years 
after relatively weak growth in 1999, 2000 and 2001 at 16.5%, 30.4% and 2.2% 
respectively.50 The media reported the “economic boom brought by China” and in 
2003 the percentage of Japanese people who held positive sentiments towards China 
grew by 2.3 points despite the row over Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine and the 
incident at the Japanese Consulate in Shenyang in May 2002.51 According to a “survey 
of 300 corporate leaders in Japan, China and South Korea” by Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
and others, the respondents who believe a free trade agreement among the three 
countries is necessary reached 70% in Japan, 64% in China and 75% in South Korea.52 
This suggests that the Japanese people started to embrace the idea that China’s stable 
development would benefit Japan. 
On the other hand, Japan supported the participation of Australia, New Zealand 
and India in the East Asia summit which was first held in December 2005 in addition 
to Japan, China, Korea and ASEAN. One of the aims was to dilute China’s influence 
by expanding the membership of the future East Asian community.53 Prime Minister 
Koizumi apparently continued his annual visit to Yasukuni shrine despite protests 
from China because he judged that if he compromised China would never stop using 
the history issue card in its diplomacy with Japan.54 In 2004, anti-Japanese sentiment 
broke out during the AFC Asian Cup soccer tournament. In 2005, anti-Japanese 
demonstrations erupted in many cities and the Chinese government campaigned all 
over the world against Japan becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. 
However, the worsening political relationship with China and South Korea was not 
received well in Japan and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe worked on restoring relations 
right after he took office. In October, 2006, Japan and China agreed on building a mu-
tually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests (strategic, mutually 
beneficial relationship). In June 2008, they reached consensus on joint development 
in the East China Sea and the participation of Japanese corporations in the develop-
ment of the oil and gas field (Shirakaba in Japanese and Chunxiao in Chinese) that had 
already been started by China. 
However, security issues are not resolved yet. Two patrol vessels of the State Oceanic 
50 “Data Room,” JC Economic Journal, No. 120 (January 2004), p. 59; “Data Room,” JC Economic 
Journal, No. 169 (February 2008), p. 43. 
51 Based on a survey by the Cabinet Office at <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h19/h19-gaiko/images/
z11.gif> (searched date: 24 April 2012).
52 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, (24 March 2004). 
53 Mie Oba, “ ‘Higashi Ajia Kyodotai’ Ron no Tenkai – Sono Haikei, Genjo, Tenbo” [The 
Development of the ‘East Asia Community’ Theory and its History, Current Situation and Future 
Outlook], Akio Takahara, Keiko Tamura, Yukio Sato (eds), Gendai Ajia Kenkyu1 Ekkyo [Modern 
Asian Studies 1 Crossing Borders] (2008), p. 458. 
54 Hitoshi Tanaka, Soichiro Tawara, Kokka to Gaiko [Nation and Diplomacy], (Tokyo: Kodansha 
2005), p. 168. 
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Administration trespassed into Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands in 
December 2008, and a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese coast guard patrol 
ships near the Senkaku islands in September 2010. Why did China provoke Japan de-
spite the agreement to make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friend-
ship? One possible reason is that China intended to unite the country and let people 
vent frustration by creating tensions with Japan and fueling anti-Japanese nationalism 
when social dissatisfaction mounted due to the slowdown of the economy. A second 
possible reason is that the forces opposing Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao tried to shake 
the current leadership that had engaged in the improvement of relations with Japan.55 
The third possible reason is that, regardless of the above political situation, the ships 
were simply implementing their patrol plan according to the Regular Patrol System to 
Protect Interests in the East China Sea, established in 2006 by the China Marine Sur-
veillance of the State Oceanic Administration.56 In any case, the fact remains that China 
is becoming bold in acting against Japan to “protect interests” as its national power in-
creases. 
From the above analysis, we can observe the complexities of the rise of China and 
the relationships with neighboring countries. Rapid economic growth certainly im-
proved the general living standards of the Chinese people and enhanced its standing 
in the international society. While that serves as a foundation for the legitimacy of the 
communist dictatorship and social stability, economic growth reached a turning point 
and the society is becoming increasingly restless. However, China’s growth rate is still 
higher than that of other countries. Unless China experiences political turbulence, it 
will continue to increase its presence in the region and the world. It is easy to foresee 
that China will try to maintain a cooperative attitude in its diplomacy by emphasizing 
peaceful development to contain the China threat theory. However, at the same time, 
it will try to expand its military capacity and will never soften its tough stance over 
specific disputes with other countries. The more unstable its domestic situation is, the 
tougher its attitude will become in international relations. China’s domestic politics and 
diplomacy are closely linked. 
Given such trends in China, what are the challenges when it comes to Japanese for-
eign policy? It all comes down to diminishing risks related to the rise of China while 
taking advantage of the opportunities it provides. In the last section, four specific mea-
sures will be discussed.57 
55 Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan several days after the incident to attend the Japan China South 
Korea trilateral summit meeting, which was independently held for the first time. 
56 See: State Oceanic Administration, “2. Haiyang Xingzheng zhifa” [2. Oceanic Administration 
Law Enforcement] in 2006 Nian Zhongguo Haiyang Xingzheng Zhifa Gongbao [China Offshore 
Administration Law Enforcement Bulletin] (6 July 2007) at <http://www.soa.gov.cn/soa/hygbml/
xzgb/six/webinfo/2007/07/1271382651593742.htm> (searched date: 24 April 2012).
57 The statement below is based on section two of Akio Takahara, “Chugoku no Yukueto Nihon 
no Taio” [China’s Future and Japan’s Response], in: National Institute for Research Advancement 
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Involvement in Indigenous Social Development and Support for Human ((( 
Security
The biggest threat China poses to Japan is the social unrest and “collapse” of the 
country. In view of economic mutual dependency and geographical proximity, there 
is no doubt that China’s unrest would cause a huge problem for Japan’s security in 
the broad sense. Of course, if China’s social order comes to the verge of collapse, 
Japan alone will not be able to support the country and there would be a limit even 
to what the entire international society will be able to do. It would be desirable for 
Japan to cooperate with China to lower the risks facing Chinese society by giving 
warnings to China before the problems surface. For example, Chinese people admit 
that Japan’s cooperation in environmental protection has played a certain role in raising 
awareness in China. China does not fully accept the concept of human security that 
Japan advocates. However, in pursuing the construction of a Harmonious Society, 
an increasing number of Chinese people show high interest in Japan’s social security 
system, environmental protection measures, and system and technology for energy 
conservation.58 
Some Japanese people insist that Japan should terminate the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to China. They argue that China holds the world’s biggest foreign 
reserves and does not need any aid from a macroeconomic point of view, that it already 
has the technology to launch astronauts into space and have them return safely, that it 
is expanding its military capability and that it already provides aid to other developing 
countries. Aid could be terminated for those reasons under normal circumstances. In 
fact, countries such as the UK and Germany already decided to terminate aid to China. 
However, this does not mean that development needs do not exist in China. There are 
many issues that constitute factors in social instability such as poverty, environmental 
pollution, water shortage and the need for energy conservation, which remain unsolved 
because of uneven distribution of funds and capacity for technological development. 
Japan should continue ODA to China to support the stable development of the country 
also from a humanitarian point of view. As the neighboring economic power that has 
the most direct interest in the stable development of China, it is Japan’s responsibility 
that it should become the last country to end assistance to China. 
Many Chinese from top to bottom in the society know that one party rule needs 
to be changed. However, there is no guarantee that the voyage of “political 
reform” without a fixed destination nor a chart will not face unexpected storms and 
reefs. Meanwhile, if the economic growth rate keeps falling, it is likely that intensified 
(NIRA), Ajia no Kadai to Nihon [Asia’s Challenges and Japan] (March 2008) at <http://www.nira.
or.jp/pdf/asiareport.takahara.pdf> (searched date: 24 April 2012).
58 For an example, see the opinion of Wang Jisi, Head of the School of International Studies of Peking 
University, who is said to have strong influence on the formation of Chinese foreign policies: Jisi 
Wang, “Chugoku wa mada hatten tojou koku” [China is still a developing country], Asahi Shimbun (15 
May 2009). 
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conflicts of interests will not be moderated or resolved in a peaceful manner and 
society will fall into deeper turmoil. At least, dispute settlements based on rules, which 
are brought about by the improvement of legal systems and the enhancement of rule of 
law, will be even more important in maintaining social stability and ensuring human 
rights. It would be desirable for Japan to continue to accept Chinese legal professionals, 
legal students, and civil servants of the central and local governments through study 
and exchange programs, which should be further expanded. 
Establishment of a Democratic Regional Regime in East Asia((( 
In East Asia, whether you like it or not, regional integration led by increasing economic 
interdependency is ongoing. In this context, if China seeks hegemony, it will inevitably 
lead to chaos in East Asia. Japan needs to support China’s stable development while 
striving with the neighboring countries to establish a mechanism that restrains China 
from giving free rein to its big power mentality. In doing so, Japan should recognize 
China as a major power and ask for a respectable attitude as a major power, and Japan 
together with other countries needs to induce China to operate the regional regime 
jointly in a democratic manner. That is, it is most important that equal and independent 
members participate in the decision making and the daily operation of the regional 
regime based on democratic institutional principles and value principles. 
Democratic value principles are described as liberty, equality and fraternity in 
France, and a common thread runs through these ideas and “harmony and coexistence” 
in the East. “Harmony” here is different from the one in Confucianism that implies a 
hierarchical order. Based on the value that we should respect different people as equals 
to cooperate and coexist with, Japan should take the lead in gradually constructing a 
regime in East Asia. 
Confidence Building with China while Maintaining the Japan-US Security ((( 
Treaty
Under the circumstance in which there is not enough trust between Japan and China, if 
China continues to expand its military capability, Japan has no choice but to maintain 
its security partnership with the US and make its own basic preparations for national 
security. In doing so, Japan has to be careful about two things. First, Japan must 
avoid the folly of entering an arms race with China. Second, it needs to establish a 
mechanism for a trilateral dialogue between Japan, the US and China, which facilitates 
confidence building. As permanent members of the Security Council, the US and 
China are negotiating and making deals over many global issues. Naturally, the US 
chooses either Japan or China, or both Japan and China as its partner depending on the 
issue. Thus, comparing and weighing the importance of Japan and China is an idea of 
the past. Some Japanese are still stuck with US-centrism, but their standpoint is not 
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symmetrical with the current US stance. Japan, which is not a permanent member of 
the Security Council yet, will be increasingly concerned that the US and China will 
bypass Japan upon deciding the strategic order in East Asia. On the other hand, the US 
might start to worry that, as China gains power, Japan will eventually fall in China’s 
sphere of influence due to geographical proximity. 
Because Japan is close to China, it is certainly essential for its security to build a 
stable and trustworthy relationship with China. To do that, not only a bilateral dialogue 
and cooperation and a trilateral with the US but also the construction of a multilateral 
framework of security in North East Asia will be helpful. One option is to use the six 
party talks framework over the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula as a base. It can 
begin with collaborative actions against non-traditional threats such as drug trafficking, 
pandemics, money laundering, environmental pollution and human trafficking to 
gradually build trust and ultimately develop into a permanent framework of traditional 
security. 
Promoting Exchanges and Dialogue for Mutual Understanding between ((( 
Japan and China 
In order for China to take the “path of peaceful development”, the relationship with 
Japan, a neighboring major power, is the biggest challenge at the moment. There 
was even a view in a third country that “China lost Japan”, which was based on the 
observation of the anti-Japanese movement in China in 2004 and 2005 that repelled 
the Japanese.59 This judgment was proven to be premature with the developments after 
Abe’s visit to China in October 2006. Japan-China relations are fragile and resilient at 
the same time. The future of the two countries’ relations remains unclear and uncertain, 
and they might become a burden to each other if their actions result in the rise of an 
exclusive nationalism. However, the bilateral relationship would be a great asset that 
can bring a huge benefit to both Japan and China, if they can separate the memory 
of the war from a future-oriented nationalism for the betterment of each country, and 
cooperate in the realization of common interests as strategic partners. To achieve this, 
they need to agree on the goal of establishing an equal partnership and gradually build 
trust by understanding the reality of the other country through calm dialogue and 
without overestimating or underestimating each other. 
There is no doubt that the spread of Japanese culture in the broad sense of the 
term through business and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) activities and the 
translation and popularization of novels, comics and animations gives a certain stimulus 
to Chinese society. Of course it is meaningful to promote mutual understanding 
and create a good image of each other to improve Japan-China relations. However, 
promotion of mutual understanding is easier said than done. Some conflicts might even 
59 From a conversation with a university professor in the US, March, 2006. 
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be generated as a result of it. Even so, however, the people of both countries seem to 
have too much negative images of the other side caused by misperception or lack of 
understanding. The government, businesses and NGOs of both countries are expected 
to strengthen efforts on public diplomacy to convey the country’s real state of affairs 
to the other. Trust and cooperation between Japan and China are indispensable for the 
construction of a democratic regime in the region. 
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